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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 
Nature Of The Case 
 
 The state appeals from the district court’s order suppressing evidence 
found as a result of a probation search. 
 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
 
 A magistrate placed Brody L. Jaskowski on supervised probation for 18 
months after his conviction for DUI.  (State’s Exhibit 1.)  One of the conditions of 
probation was: 
9. WARRANTLESS SEARCHES: I shall submit and I agree to 
polygraph examinations, warrantless searches of my person, 
personal property, electronic devices, automobiles, residence, and 
outbuildings at the request of my Probation Officer, by the 
Probation Officer, Peace Officer, and/or his designee; with or 
without Probable Cause; any time day or night. I understand that 
any Alcohol, evidence, and/or Contraband will be confiscated, and 
new charges can be filed in the event of criminal activity. 
 
(State’s Exhibit 1, p. 3.) 
 A few days before the expiration of Jaskowski’s probation, a police officer 
was looking for him to serve an arrest warrant.  (R., p. 156.)  Knowing Jaskowski 
was on probation, the officer contacted his probation officer.  (Id.)  The probation 
officer also requested that the officer stop Jaskowski.  (Id.)  The probation officer 
requested the stop so he could “see” Jaskowski, whom he had not had personal 
contact with for a while, and to “test” him.  (R., p. 159.)  The officer stopped 
Jaskowski while Jaskowski was driving, but learned before making contact with 
him that the warrant had been withdrawn.  (R., p. 156.)  The officer proceeded 
with the traffic stop on the basis that the probation officer had also requested the 
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officer to stop Jaskowski.  (Id.)  The officer ultimately cited Jaskowski for failure 
to have a current driver’s license.  (R., pp. 156-57.) 
 The probation officer arrived at the scene of the stop, talked to Jaskowski, 
and searched his car.  (R., p. 157.)  The probation officer found a glass pipe with 
methamphetamine residue on it.  (R., p. 158.)  The probation officer requested 
that the police officer take Jaskowski into custody and then the probation officer 
and the police officer continued the search of Jaskowski’s car and found another 
pipe with methamphetamine residue.  (R., pp. 157-59.)  
 The state charged Jaskowski with possession of a controlled substance.  
(R., pp. 6-7, 56.)  Jaskowski moved to suppress “all evidence seized following 
the unconstitutional stop.”  (R., pp. 94-95.)  In a memorandum in support of the 
motion, Jaskowski submitted three issues:  
A. Was [Police] Officer Wells and/or [Probation] Officer Harper 
authorized to stop Jaskowski’s vehicle based solely upon an 
alleged waiver of 4th Amendment Rights and a desire to speak with 
Jaskowski? 
 
B. Does the existence of a warrant for arrest and its subsequent 
recall form the basis for a permissible traffic stop? 
 
C. Did the state of Idaho adequately meet its burden of proof at the 
preliminary hearing with the introduction of a field test conducted by 
the officer with no scientific foundation concerning the reliability of 
the test? 
 
(R., p. 106.)   
 The district court concluded that the traffic stop did not violate Jaskowski’s 
Fourth Amendment rights because his agreement to submit to warrantless 
searches included an implied consent to a limited seizure of his person.  (R., 
pp. 161-65.)  It granted the suppression motion, however, based on the 
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conclusion that the search of Jaskowski’s car violated his rights because the 
probation officer “did not request permission or consent to search the vehicle.”  
(R., pp. 165-67.)  The state filed a timely notice of appeal from the order granting 
suppression of evidence found in the probation search of Jaskowski’s car.  (R., 






 Did the district court err when it concluded that Jaskowski’s probation 






The District Court’s Conclusion That Jaskowski’s Probation Conditions Did Not 
Waive His Right Against Warrantless Searches Of His Car By His Probation 




 Concluding that the decision in State v. Turek, 150 Idaho 745, 250 P.3d 
796 (Ct. App. 2011), was “controlling,” the district court held the search of 
Jaskowski’s car violated his rights against unreasonable searches because the 
probation officer “did not request permission or consent to search the vehicle.”  
(R., pp. 166-67.)  The district court’s decision is in error because it misread the 
clear holding in Turek that the probationer must be informed of an officer’s intent 
to conduct an impending search pursuant to a probation waiver such as imposed 
upon Jaskowski.  The district court’s holding that the probation officer was 
required to do more than inform Jaskowski of the impending search, and instead 
obtain an independent consent before conducting a proper search, was in no 
way required by the holding of Turek, and was reversible error. 
 
B. Standard Of Review 
 
 “When reviewing a motion to suppress, this Court defers to the district 
court’s findings of fact unless the findings are clearly erroneous. But this Court 
may undertake a free review of the district court’s determination as to whether 
constitutional requirements have been satisfied in light of the facts found.”  State 





C. The Search Of His Car Did Not Infringe On Any Privacy Right Held By 
Jaskowski During His Probation 
 
 Probationers enjoy a reduced expectation of privacy. Samson v. 
California, 547 U.S. 843, 848 (2006); United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 118 
(2001); State v. Klingler, 143 Idaho 494, 497, 148 P.3d 1240, 1243 (2006); State 
v. Gawron, 112 Idaho 841, 843, 736 P.2d 1295, 1297 (1987); State v. Cruz, 
144 Idaho 906, 908, 174 P.3d 876, 878 (Ct. App. 2007).  One such reduction in 
the expectation of privacy may arise from “an advance waiver of fourth 
amendment rights” as a condition of probation.  Gawron, 112 Idaho at 843, 
736 P.2d at 1297.  See also Knights, 534 U.S. at 118-21 (probation condition 
“significantly diminish[ed] Knights’ reasonable expectation of privacy”); Cruz, 
144 Idaho at 910, 174 P.3d at 880 (“Cruz’s parole condition significantly 
diminished his reasonable expectation of privacy”).  The Idaho Supreme Court 
“has determined that a probationer’s consent to searches constitutes a waiver of 
Fourth Amendment rights.”  State v. Purdum, 147 Idaho 206, 208, 207 P.3d 182, 
184 (2009).  “Idaho appellate courts have long recognized that parolees and 
probationers have a diminished expectation of privacy and will enforce Fourth 
Amendment waivers as a condition of parole or probation.”  State v. Hedgecock, 
147 Idaho 580, 584, 212 P.3d 1010, 1014 (Ct. App. 2009). 
 In Turek, the Idaho Court of Appeals applied these legal principles to a 
probation search condition similar to the one executed by Jaskowski, and 
concluded that it did not constitute “a complete waiver of all Fourth Amendment 
rights.”  Turek, 150 Idaho at 749, 250 P.3d at 800 (emphasis original).  The Court 
held that “a probation condition that requires a probationer to submit to a search 
7 
 
‘at the request of’ an officer requires that the probationer be informed of an 
officer’s intent to conduct an impending search.”  Id. at 752, 250 P.3d at 803 
(emphasis added).  In this case, the probation officer “advised” Jaskowski he was 
going to “search the vehicle.”  (11/17/16 Tr., p. 7, Ls. 2-14.)  Because Jaskowski 
was informed of the probation officer’s intent to conduct an impending search, 
the search of the car complied with the Fourth Amendment waiver as interpreted 
in Turek. 
 The district court concluded that the search was improper because the 
probation officer “did not request permission or consent to search” but instead 
made the “declaratory statement” of his intent to search.  (R., p. 167.)     
However, under the plain language of the holding of Turek, the Fourth 
Amendment waiver at issue merely required that Jaskowski “be informed of an 
officer’s intent to conduct an impending search.”  Turek, 150 Idaho at 752, 
250 P.3d at 803 (emphasis added).  The district court’s requirement that the 
probation officer secure “permission or consent to search” on top of the Fourth 
Amendment waiver is not required by Turek. 
 Requiring “permission or consent” in addition to the rights waiver is also 
inconsistent with the above-cited law because it would render the Fourth 
Amendment waiver a nullity.  As set forth above, “a probationer’s consent to 
searches constitutes a waiver of Fourth Amendment rights.”  Purdum, 147 Idaho 
at 208, 207 P.3d at 184.  “Idaho appellate courts have long recognized that 
parolees and probationers have a diminished expectation of privacy and will 
enforce Fourth Amendment waivers as a condition of parole or probation.”  
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Hedgecock, 147 Idaho at 584, 212 P.3d at 1014.  Interpreting Jaskowski’s Fourth 
Amendment waiver as merely allowing a probation officer to request Jaskowski’s 
consent to search, something the probation officer could do without a waiver, 
renders the waiver a nullity.  Compare Turek, 150 Idaho at 749, 250 P.3d at 800 
(Fourth Amendment waiver in question is a waiver, albeit not “a complete waiver 
of all Fourth Amendment rights” (emphasis   original)).  Moreover, such an 
interpretation would make the Fourth Amendment waiver completely redundant 
to the first condition of probation requiring compliance with all “lawful requests” of 
probation officers and police officers.  (Exhibit 1, p. 2.) 
The language of probation condition 9 and the holding of Turek show that 
Jaskowski entered a waiver, albeit not a “complete” waiver, of Fourth 
Amendment rights that reduced his expectation of privacy.  Jaskowski was still 
entitled to be informed of the intent to search, but he was so informed.  The 
search in this case did not infringe upon Jaskowski’s reduced expectation of 
privacy, and therefore did not violate the Fourth Amendment.  The district court 






 The state respectfully requests this Court to reverse the district court’s 
order suppressing evidence and remand for further proceedings. 
 DATED this 14th day of June, 2017. 
 
 
      __/s/ Kenneth K. Jorgensen________ 
      KENNETH K. JORGENSEN 
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